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Religious liberty is a bedrock principle of our national heritage.1  
The Supreme Court has recognized that the Founders saw the separa-
tion of church and state as necessary to guarantee individuals the 
freedom to openly practice the religion of their choosing without fear 
of governmental persecution.2  James Madison, for example, was a 
strong supporter of the federal protection of religious freedom.3  The 
 
1 The Supreme Court has explained that  
 [w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.  
We guarantee the freedom to worship as one chooses.  We make room for as 
wide a variety of beliefs and creeds as the spiritual needs of man deem neces-
sary.  We sponsor an attitude on the part of government that shows no partial-
ity to any one group and that lets each flourish according to the zeal of its ad-
herents and the appeal of its dogma. 
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952). 
2 See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1947) (“A large proportion of 
the early settlers of this country came here from Europe to escape the bondage of laws 
which compelled them to support and attend government-favored churches.”). 
3 During the debates over the Constitution in the Virginia Ratifying Convention, 
Madison opined that religious freedom was better guarded by the Federal Congress 
than by the legislature of any one state. 
There is not a shadow of right in the General Government to intermeddle 
with religion.—Its least interference with it would be a most flagrant usurpa-
tion.—I can appeal to my uniform conduct on this subject, that I have warmly 
supported religious freedom.—It is better that this security should be de-
pended upon from the General Legislature, than from one particular State. 
Patrick Henry & James Madison, Remarks at the Virginia Ratifying Convention ( June 
12, 1788), reprinted in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 673, 690 (Bernard Bailyn 
ed., 1993).   
 In fact, Madison would have preferred broader protection than was politically pa-
latable at the time.  Madison’s initial draft of the Federal Bill of Rights sought to pro-
tect “full and equal rights of conscience,” not simply free exercise of religion, from in-
fringement “in any manner, or on any pretext.”  1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451 ( Joseph 
Gales ed., 1834) (emphasis added).  But cf. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Dan-
bury Baptist Ass’n ( Jan. 1, 1802) (“Believing with you that religion is a matter which 
lies solely between man and his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith 
or his worship, that the legitimate powers of government reach actions only, and not 
opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American 
people which declared that their legislature should ‘make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,’ thus building a wall of 
separation between church and State.”), in THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 510, 510 
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Bill of Rights thus enshrines religious liberty as a fundamental right 
and places it prominently at the beginning of the First Amendment.4 
Over time, however, the protections guaranteed by the First 
Amendment have been qualified by judicial decisionmaking.  In 1990, 
the Supreme Court held in Employment Division v. Smith that a neutral, 
generally applicable law is entitled to deferential rational basis review, 
even if the law prohibits conduct central to an individual’s religion.5  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Smith dramatically limited prior Su-
preme Court precedent that had required strict scrutiny of any law 
substantially infringing upon the right to free exercise of religion.6  
The widespread perception that principles of stare decisis had been 
violated by the Smith Court provoked a powerful congressional re-
sponse.  At least two bills signed into law sought to restore the reli-
gious freedom thought to have been lost after Smith.7 
The latest congressional attempt to restore the religious liberty 
promised by the Constitution is the Religious Land Use and Institu-
tionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA).8  RLUIPA contains an Equal 
Terms provision, which states that “[n]o government shall impose or 
implement a land use regulation in a manner that treats a religious 
assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious 
assembly or institution.”9  As this Comment will show, however, some 
federal courts have interpreted RLUIPA in such a way as to render it 
toothless. 
 
(Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984).  The fact that Madison’s preferred language was not 
adopted further indicates that the Free Exercise Clause was specifically meant to pro-
tect religion as opposed to philosophy or other nonreligious belief systems.  See Mi-
chael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 
103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1491 (1990) (arguing that the choice of the term “free exer-
cise of religion” “singles out religion for special treatment”). 
4 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”). 
5 See 494 U.S. 872, 885-87 (1990), superseded by statute, Religious Land Use and Insti-
tutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803, as recognized in Cutter 
v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRIN-
CIPLES AND POLICIES § 12.3.2.3, at 1259 (3d ed. 2006) (explaining that, post-Smith, ration-
al basis review applies to neutral and generally applicable laws that burden religion). 
6 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (requiring a compelling state 
interest in order to justify substantial infringement of the First Amendment right to 
free exercise of religion). 
7 One of these bills, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 
2000, is the focus of this Comment.  The second is the Act’s ill-fated predecessor, the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, discussed infra Section I.C. 
8 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2006). 
9 Id. § 2000cc(b)(1). 
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The federal circuit courts are split as to the proper interpretation 
of the Equal Terms provision.  The Eleventh Circuit noted in Midrash 
Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside that while the provision “has the ‘feel’ 
of an equal protection law, it lacks the ‘similarly situated’ requirement 
usually found in equal protection analysis.”10  Therefore, a land-use 
regulation violates RLUIPA if a secular assembly or institution, in the 
ordinary sense of those terms, can locate where a religious assembly or 
institution cannot.11  The Seventh Circuit agreed, stating in Vision 
Church v. Village of Long Grove that “a plaintiff need not demonstrate 
disparate treatment between two institutions similarly situated in all re-
levant respects.”12  The Third Circuit disagreed with both the Seventh 
and Eleventh Circuits, holding in Lighthouse Institute for Evangelism, Inc. 
v. City of Long Branch that “a regulation will violate the Equal Terms 
provision only if it treats religious assemblies or institutions less well 
than secular assemblies or institutions that are similarly situated as to 
the regulatory purpose.”13 
The Third Circuit also disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit regard-
ing the standard of review that should apply to a regulation upon a 
finding of unequal treatment.14  While the Eleventh Circuit held that 
the challenged regulation should receive strict scrutiny upon a finding 
of unequal treatment,15 the Third Circuit held that the government 
should be held strictly liable for a violation of the Equal Terms provi-
sion.  Thus, under the Third Circuit’s test, the challenged regulation 
is automatically invalidated upon a finding of unequal treatment.16 
The Third Circuit’s interpretation of RLUIPA’s Equal Terms 
provision responds to a valid concern that the provision should not 
 
10 366 F.3d 1214, 1229 (11th Cir. 2004). 
11 See id. at 1230-31 (construing the terms “assembly” and “institution” “in accor-
dance with their ordinary or natural meanings” and concluding that because “private 
clubs, churches and synagogues fall under the umbrella of ‘assembly or institution[,]’ 
. . . differential treatment constitutes a violation of § (b)(1) of RLUIPA”). 
12 468 F.3d 975, 1003 (7th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added). 
13 510 F.3d 253, 266 (3d Cir. 2007). 
14 The Seventh Circuit has not yet addressed these standard of review issues.  See 
Sarah Keeton Campbell, Note, Restoring RLUIPA’s Equal Terms Provision, 58 DUKE L.J. 
1071, 1074 & n.14 (2009) (“The Seventh Circuit has addressed the first issue, but not 
the second.”). 
15 See Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1232 (“[A] violation of § (b)’s equal treatment provi-
sion, consistent with the analysis employed in [Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. 
v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)], must undergo strict scrutiny.”). 
16 See Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 269 (“[I]f a land-use regulation treats religious assem-
blies or institutions on less than equal terms with nonreligious assemblies or institu-
tions that are no less harmful to the governmental objectives in enacting the regula-
tion, that regulation—without more—fails under RLUIPA.”). 
9 MINERVINI REVISED FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/1/2010  6:32 PM 
2010] Freedom from Religion 575 
be interpreted to grant religious entities greater rights than secular 
entities.  In light of the text and legislative history of RLUIPA, how-
ever, the imposition of a “similarly situated” requirement and a 
strict-liability standard of review ignores the plain language of the 
statute as well as Congress’s express purpose in enacting it.  The Ele-
venth Circuit’s interpretation in Midrash is more consistent with the 
text of the statute, Congress’s express findings of religious discrimi-
nation, and RLUIPA’s purpose. 
In her insightful Note, recently published in the Duke Law Jour-
nal, Sarah Keeton Campbell argues that a strict textual interpretation 
of the Equal Terms provision would be within Congress’s powers un-
der Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.17  While Campbell con-
tends that imposing a similarly situated requirement on the Equal 
Terms provision is inappropriate, she does not believe that the appro-
priate standard of review is strict scrutiny of the challenged regulation 
upon a finding of unequal treatment.18  This Comment, in contrast, 
argues that the strict-liability standard of review advocated by Camp-
bell might exceed the boundaries set by the Supreme Court’s holding 
in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.19  The text of 
RLUIPA expressly provides that the Act should be construed to pro-
tect religious exercise to the broadest extent constitutionally permissi-
ble,20 which, under Lukumi, means strict scrutiny of the challenged 
regulation. 
In Part I of this Comment, I review the history of federal protec-
tion of religious exercise from the ratification of the Constitution to 
the enactment of RLUIPA.  In Part II, I summarize the judicial inter-
pretations of RLUIPA’s Equal Terms provision.  Finally, in Part III, I 
argue that the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation in Midrash is prefera-
ble because it recognizes legislative supremacy and effectuates the will 
of the American people as expressed in the text of the statute enacted 
by their elected representatives. 
 
17 Campbell, supra note 14, at 1075-76.  Section 5 empowers Congress “to enforce, 
by apropriate legislation, the provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment].”  U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
18 See Campbell, supra note 14, at 1104. 
19 See 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993) (“A law burdening religious practice that is not 
neutral or not of general application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny.  To 
satisfy the commands of the First Amendment, a law restrictive of religious practice 
must advance interests of the highest order and must be narrowly tailored in pursuit of 
those interests.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
20 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g) (2006). 
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I.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF FEDERAL PROTECTION OF RELIGIOUS EXERCISE 
Our nation has enjoyed a long and distinguished history of 
upholding every American’s right to freely profess and practice the 
religious beliefs of her choice.  This Part provides a brief overview of 
the federal protection of religious exercise. 
A.  The Constitution 
The Constitution is the starting point for any analysis of religious-
liberty rights.  The First Amendment provides two forms of protection 
for religion:  the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.21  
This Comment is primarily concerned with the protections conferred by 
the Free Exercise Clause, which prevents the states and the federal gov-
ernment from passing any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion.22 
The Bill of Rights was enacted as a result of popular concern that 
the federal government would not be accountable to the people in 
the absence of express restrictions on the exercise of governmental 
authority.23  The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment were largely 
designed to assuage fears that the federal government might attempt 
to establish religion or prohibit religious exercise in the states,24 as 
well as to guarantee that the religious preferences of one state would 
not be imposed on the country as a whole.  The Founders’ use of the 
term “free exercise” implies that the Clause was meant to protect not 
only religious belief but also religious conduct.25  Indeed, the Supreme 
Court itself has stated that “[t]he Free Exercise Clause . . . withdraws 
from legislative power, state and federal, the exertion of any restraint on 
 
21 See supra note 4. 
22 Id.; see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (incorporating the 
Free Exercise Clause against the states). 
23 See, e.g., Kenneth R. Bowling, “A Tub to the Whale”:  The Founding Fathers and 
Adoption of the Federal Bill of Rights, 8 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 223, 251 (1988) (“The constitu-
tional role as well as the consecrated status of the federal Bill of Rights today is due less 
to the foresight of the Founding Fathers than to the vigilance of a concerned citize-
nry . . . .”); Samuel Bryan, “Centinel” I, INDEP. GAZETTEER (Phila.), Oct. 5, 1787 (ar-
guing that a federal government without a Bill of Rights similar to that found in most 
free Constitutions “would be in practice a permanent aristocracy” (emphasis omit-
ted)), reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 3, at 52, 61. 
24 See McConnell, supra note 3, at 1477-79 (examining the shortcomings of the Fe-
deralist argument against a Bill of Rights, including that powers such as those enume-
rated in the Necessary and Proper Clause have the potential to be used oppressively). 
25 Id. at 1488.  McConnell goes on to note that the Supreme Court puzzlingly re-
jected this reading of the term “free exercise” in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 
164 (1879), and did not acknowledge the protection of religiously motivated conduct 
afforded by the Free Exercise Clause until 1940.  Id. at 1488-89. 
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the free exercise of religion.  Its purpose is to secure religious liberty in 
the individual by prohibiting any invasions thereof by civil authority.”26 
The next constitutional provision relevant to recent congressional 
attempts to protect religious liberty is the Fourteenth Amendment.  
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that 
no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law.”27  “Liberty” includes the religious liberty con-
ferred by the First Amendment.28  Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment further provides that “Congress shall have power to en-
force, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”29  Thus, 
when Congress has found the states to be remiss in their duty, Section 
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment enables Congress to use its remedial 
power to enact laws enforcing the guarantees of religious liberty 
found in the First Amendment.  RLUIPA is one such law. 
B.  Case Law Interpreting the Free Exercise Clause 
The first case to interpret the Free Exercise Clause came down in 
1879.30  In Reynolds v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a Mor-
mon who had contracted plural marriages could not obtain a religious 
exemption from the federal antipolygamy statute.31  The Court, decid-
ing not to protect religiously motivated conduct in the face of a general-
ly applicable criminal law,32 thus interpreted the Free Exercise Clause 
countertextually.  This interpretation remained unchanged until the 
1940 case of Cantwell v. Connecticut, in which the Court upheld the right 
 
26 Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1963). 
27 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
28 In Cantwell v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court held that 
[t]he fundamental concept of liberty embodied in [the Fourteenth] Amend-
ment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment.  The First 
Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.  The Fourteenth 
Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as 
Congress to enact such laws. 
310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 
29 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
30 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, § 12.3.1, at 1246. 
31 See 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1879) (explaining that a religious exemption for Mor-
mons would subordinate the law to religious belief). 
32 See id. at 166 (“Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they 
cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.”). 
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of Jehovah’s Witnesses to proselytize without prior governmental re-
straint, even in ways considered aggressive and offensive to Catholics.33 
In the 1963 case of Sherbert v. Verner, the Court adopted a more 
expansive reading of the Free Exercise Clause, one that embraced not 
only protection for religiously motivated conduct but also religious 
exemption from generally applicable laws.34  Sherbert involved a mem-
ber of the Seventh-day Adventist Church who was discharged by her 
employer because she refused to work on Saturday, the Sabbath for 
Seventh-day Adventists.35  The South Carolina Unemployment Com-
pensation Act required that a claimant be able to work and be availa-
ble for work in order to be eligible for unemployment benefits.36  The 
Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to the South Carolina law, re-
quiring a compelling state interest in order to justify substantial in-
fringement of the First Amendment right to free exercise of religion.37  
The compelling state interest asserted by South Carolina was the un-
proven possibility of “unscrupulous” workers filing fraudulent claims 
for unemployment compensation using the pretext of religious obser-
vance.38  The Court held that South Carolina could not constitutional-
ly deny one of its citizens unemployment compensation simply be-
cause she refused to compromise her religious beliefs in order to 
come within the statute’s prescription.39  The statute thus failed strict 
scrutiny.  This was the law of the land until 1988. 
In 1988, the Supreme Court decided Lyng v. Northwest Indian Ceme-
tery Protective Ass’n.40  The case posed the question whether the Free 
Exercise Clause prohibited the government from building a road 
through part of a national forest traditionally used by Native Ameri-
cans for religious purposes.41  The Native Americans argued that the 
road construction could not be upheld without a compelling state in-
terest because it would impose a substantial burden on their religious 
exercise.42  The Supreme Court disagreed, reasoning that the govern-
ment’s decision did not “penalize religious activity by denying any 
 
33 See 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940) (“[A] state may not unduly suppress free communi-
cation of views, religious or other, under the guise of conserving desirable conditions.”). 
34 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
35 Id. at 399. 
36 Id. at 400. 
37 Id. at 406. 
38 Id. at 407. 
39 Id. at 410. 
40 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
41 Id. at 441-42. 
42 Id. at 447. 
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person an equal share of the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by 
other citizens.”43  The Court further reasoned that the government 
had a right to decide what to do with its land and that, while accom-
modation of religious practices was to be encouraged, the Constitu-
tion “does not . . . offer to reconcile [religious organizations’] various 
competing demands on government.”44 
In 1990, the Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Em-
ployment Division v. Smith.45  Smith effectively overturned Sherbert by 
holding that the compelling interest test would no longer apply to a 
neutral, generally applicable law, even if the law prohibits conduct 
central to an individual’s religion.46  Smith involved two Native Ameri-
cans who were fired from their jobs and then denied unemployment 
compensation because they had ingested peyote, a controlled sub-
stance under federal and Oregon state law, “for sacramental purposes 
at a ceremony of the Native American Church.”47  The Court held that 
rational basis review applied to the state unemployment-compensation 
statute and that Oregon could constitutionally deny the ex-employees 
unemployment benefits because the criminal drug laws were neutral 
and generally applicable.48  The Court retained the compelling inter-
est test, however, for situations where the government has a system of 
individualized exemptions in place.49 
Just such a system of individualized exemptions was presented to 
the Court in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.50  In 
that case, members of the Santeria religion, which practices ritual an-
imal sacrifice, were found to have been discriminated against by facial-
ly neutral city ordinances prohibiting all ritual animal sacrifice.51  The 
ordinances were riddled with exceptions for animals raised for food 
purposes (including an exception for kosher slaughter), clearly evinc-
ing that the state’s interests in protecting the public health and pre-
venting cruelty to animals were being pursued only against Santeria 
practitioners.52  There was also evidence that the ordinances were 
 
43 Id. at 449. 
44 Id. at 452, 454. 
45 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
46 Id. at 883-85. 
47 Id. at 874. 
48 Id. at 890. 
49 Id. at 884. 
50 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
51 Id. at 525-29, 532. 
52 See id. at 543 (“[The ordinances] fail to prohibit nonreligious conduct that en-
dangers these interests in a similar or greater degree than Santeria sacrifice does.”). 
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enacted in response to the Santeria church’s announcement of its 
plans to open in Hialeah.53  The Court found that the ordinances were 
neither neutral nor generally applicable.54  The Court then held that 
“[a] law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of gen-
eral application . . . must advance interests of the highest order and 
must be narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests.”55  In other 
words, where a law that burdens religion is either not neutral or not 
generally applicable, the compelling interest test still controls. 
Despite the exception for a system of individualized exemptions, 
Smith did away with the compelling interest test for neutral, generally 
applicable laws.  Some, like Marci Hamilton in her book God vs. the 
Gavel,56 have argued that Smith was not a departure from settled 
precedent at all.  Hamilton writes that Smith “cast the preceding cases 
that had seemed to rest on a principle at odds with the dominant ap-
proach[] in a different light to show that they were not inconsistent 
with the long-established principles the Court was reaffirming.”57  On 
the other hand, the Court may simply have been searching for a way 
out of creating religious exemptions to generally applicable criminal 
laws.  Regardless, many argued after Smith that “the Court had over-
turned a long-settled doctrine that required strict scrutiny of any law, 
no matter how neutral, that substantially burdened religious con-
duct.”58  Congress, as it turned out, agreed with this latter point of view. 
C.  RFRA and City of Boerne v. Flores 
In the wake of Smith, Congress responded by enacting the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).59  Finding that Smith 
had “virtually eliminated” the compelling interest test previously appli-
cable to burdens on religious exercise imposed by neutral laws,60 Con-
gress reinstated that test, mandating that even rules of general applica-
bility could only substantially burden religious exercise if they were 
 
53 Id. at 540-41 (opinion of Kennedy, J.). 
54 See id. at 542, 545-46 (majority opinion) (holding that the ordinances were not 
neutral because their object was to suppress religion and that they were not generally 
applicable because the government’s interests were pursued only against religiously 
motivated conduct). 
55 Id. at 546 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
56 MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL:  RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW (2005). 
57 Id. at 221.  But see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, § 12.3.2.3, at 1258 (“In Employment 
Division v. Smith, the Court expressly changed the law of the free exercise clause.”). 
58 HAMILTON, supra note 56, at 223. 
59 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006). 
60 Id. § 2000bb(a)(4). 
9 MINERVINI REVISED FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/1/2010  6:32 PM 
2010] Freedom from Religion 581 
both “in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest” and “the 
least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental in-
terest.”61  Exercising its Section 5 power to enact legislation enforcing 
the Free Exercise Clause, Congress attempted to reverse the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Smith.62  The Supreme Court, however, was less than 
pleased with Congress’s enactment. 
In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court reviewed a decision by local 
zoning authorities in Texas that had denied a Catholic church a build-
ing permit that would have allowed the church to expand.63  The 
church was built in the mission style and was too small to accommo-
date its parishioners at some Masses.64  Boerne authorities relied on a 
recently enacted historic-preservation ordinance requiring the Histor-
ic Landmark Commission to preapprove any construction affecting 
historic landmarks.65  Flores, the Catholic archbishop of San Antonio, 
challenged the decision under RFRA, arguing that it imposed a sub-
stantial burden on the religious exercise of San Antonio Catholics 
without a compelling state justification.66  The Court held that Con-
gress had exceeded its remedial power under Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment in enacting RFRA and further held RFRA uncons-
titutional as applied against the states.67  RFRA still applies, however, 
to the federal government.68  The major fault the Court found with 
RFRA was that the law was too broad to be properly considered re-
medial legislation and thus constituted an impermissible attempt to 
alter substantive constitutional rights.69  After the Court struck down 
 
61 Id. § 2000bb-1. 
62 See S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 14 (1993), as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1903 
(“Because the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is clearly designed to implement the 
free exercise clause . . . it falls squarely within Congress’ section 5 enforcement power.”). 
63 521 U.S. 507, 512 (1997). 
64 Id. at 511-12. 
65 Id. at 512. 
66 Id. at 512, 529. 
67 See id. at 536 (“[A]s the provisions of the federal statute here invoked are beyond 
congressional authority, it is this Court’s precedent, not RFRA, which must control.”). 
68 See 146 CONG. REC. 19,124 (2000) (statement of Rep. Canady) (“Sections 
7(a)(1) and (2) and (7)(b) [of RLUIPA] collectively conform RFRA to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in City of Boerne v. Flores . . . leaving RFRA applicable only to the feder-
al government.” (citation omitted)). 
69 The Court reasoned that 
[r]emedial legislation under § 5 “should be adapted to the mischief and 
wrong which the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment was intended to provide 
against.”   
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RFRA as overbroad, Congress responded by enacting RLUIPA to target 
discrimination against religious entities by state and local governments. 
D.  RLUIPA 
In response to the Supreme Court’s criticism in Boerne, Congress 
drafted a narrower religious-freedom bill.  RLUIPA is the end product 
of Congress’s effort.  As opposed to RFRA, which was indiscriminate 
in its zeal to protect religious liberty, RLUIPA specifically targets two 
areas in which governmental entities regularly make individualized as-
sessments that may impact a person’s religious freedom:  religious 
land use and the religious exercise of institutionalized persons.70  By 
retaining the compelling interest test only for these areas, RLUIPA fits 
into the exception that the Court left open in Smith.71  The chief spon-
sors of RLUIPA in the Senate, Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts and 
Orrin Hatch of Utah, spearheaded congressional hearings that found 
that the right to assemble for worship is frequently violated by state 
and local governments.72  The Senators noted that discrimination of-
ten “lurks behind such vague and universally applicable reasons as 
traffic, aesthetics, or ‘not consistent with the city’s land use plan.’”73  
 
 RFRA is not so confined.  Sweeping coverage ensures its intrusion at every 
level of government, displacing laws and prohibiting official actions of almost 
every description and regardless of subject matter. 
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532 (citation omitted). 
70 See 146 CONG. REC. 16,622 (2000) (statement of Rep. Canady) (asserting that 
RLUIPA uses Congress’s authority to protect the right to gather and worship and the 
religious exercise of institutionalized persons). 
71 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990) (“As the plurality 
pointed out in [Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986)], our decisions in the unemploy-
ment cases stand for the proposition that where the State has in place a system of indi-
vidual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of ‘religious hard-
ship’ without compelling reason.”).  The Supreme Court has upheld RLUIPA’s 
institutionalized-persons provisions against Establishment Clause challenge.  See Cutter 
v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005).  In addition, the Second Circuit has validated 
the constitutionality of RLUIPA’s land-use provisions under the Commerce Clause, the 
Tenth Amendment, and the Establishment Clause.  See Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of 
Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 353-56 (2d Cir. 2007).  The Supreme Court has not yet 
passed judgment on the constitutionality of RLUIPA’s land-use provisions. 
72 See 146 CONG. REC. 16,698 (2000) ( joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Ken-
nedy on RLUIPA) (“Churches in general, and new, small, or unfamiliar churches in 
particular, are frequently discriminated against on the face of zoning codes and also in 
the highly individualized and discretionary processes of land use regulation.”). 
73 Id. 
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As a result, the Senators concluded that “discrimination against reli-
gious uses is a nationwide problem” requiring a federal solution.74 
RLUIPA defines “religious exercise” to include the “use, building, 
or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise.”75  
The statute reinstates the compelling interest test for land-use regula-
tions that impose a substantial burden on an individual’s religious ex-
ercise, unless imposition of the burden is in furtherance of a compel-
ling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of 
furthering that compelling governmental interest.76  Additionally, 
RLUIPA provides that the Act “shall be construed in favor of a broad 
protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by 
the terms of this [Act] and the Constitution.”77 
RLUIPA also seeks to remedy discrimination and exclusion in re-
ligious land use.78  The Equal Terms provision is one example of Con-
gress’s remedial purpose.  It is important to note at the outset that the 
Discrimination and Exclusion provisions of RLUIPA operate inde-
pendently of the Substantial Burden provision—that is, a plaintiff 
does not have to prove a substantial burden on religious exercise to 
state a claim under the Discrimination and Exclusion provisions.79 
RLUIPA’s Equal Terms provision, the focal point of this Com-
ment, provides that “[n]o government shall impose or implement a 
land use regulation in a manner that treats a religious assembly or in-
stitution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or in-
stitution.”80  The statute’s command is clear:  a land-use regulation 
cannot on its face or by its application treat a religious assembly or in-
stitution worse than a nonreligious assembly or institution.  The legis-
lative history explains that the Equal Terms provision “more squarely 
addresses the case in which the unequal treatment of different land 
 
74 Id. at 16,699. 
75 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(B) (2006). 
76 Id. §§ 2000cc(a)(1), 2000cc-1(a). 
77 Id. § 2000cc-3(g). 
78 Id. § 2000cc(b). 
79 See Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 762 (7th 
Cir. 2003) (“[T]he substantial burden and nondiscrimination provisions are operative-
ly independent of one another . . . .”); see also Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, The Ge-
nesis of RLUIPA and Federalism:  Evaluating the Creation of a Federal Statutory Right and Its 
Impact on Local Government, 40 URB. LAW. 195, 246 (2008) (“The equal terms provision, 
the courts have made clear, is conceptually distinct from RLUIPA’s substantial burden 
section.”). 
80 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1). 
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uses does not fall into any apparent pattern.”81  The legislative history 
further states that the Discrimination and Exclusion provisions codify 
parts, but not all, of the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence 
as applied to land-use regulation.82 
RLUIPA provides religious entities neither land-use immunity nor 
a blanket exemption from application for variances, special permits, 
or other relief provisions.83  The Equal Terms provision simply man-
dates equal treatment of religious and nonreligious assemblies and in-
stitutions with respect to land-use regulation. 
II.  THE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF RLUIPA’S  
EQUAL TERMS PROVISION 
Understanding the background and history behind RLUIPA, we 
may now proceed to examine how courts have interpreted the sta-
tute’s Equal Terms provision.  Despite its apparent simplicity, RLUI-
PA’s Equal Terms provision has raised genuine problems of interpre-
tation for federal courts.  Judges have struggled to discern exactly 
what Congress meant when it proclaimed that religious assemblies 
and institutions must not be treated on less than equal terms with 
nonreligious assemblies and institutions.  In particular, federal courts 
have sent mixed messages as to what a religious plaintiff must demon-
strate in order to establish an Equal Terms violation.  Must religious 
plaintiffs simply produce a nonreligious assembly or institution that is 
permitted where the plaintiffs are not?  Must they produce a nonreli-
gious assembly or institution that is similarly situated as to the regulato-
ry purpose of the challenged land-use regulation?  If so, what does it 
mean to be similarly situated?  What counts as a nonreligious assembly 
or institution in the first place?  Do different standards apply if the 
challenge to the regulation is facial or as applied?  Should the stan-
dard of review applied to a challenged regulation upon a finding of 
unequal treatment be strict scrutiny or strict liability?  Questions such 
as these abound in the case law. 
While the Substantial Burden provision has generated a sizeable 
body of case law, there are far fewer circuit court opinions analyzing 
 
81 146 CONG. REC. 19,123 (2000) (statement of Rep. Canady). 
82 See id. 
83 See id. at 16,700 (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy on RLUI-
PA) (“This Act does not provide religious institutions with immunity from land use 
regulation . . . .”). 
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the Equal Terms provision.84  Nonetheless, the Equal Terms provision 
has been examined by three federal appellate courts:  the Eleventh, 
Seventh, and Third Circuits.  The Eleventh Circuit has dealt with the 
provision most extensively, and the Seventh and Third Circuits have 
drawn upon the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in deciding their own 
cases.  A circuit split has emerged between the Seventh and Eleventh 
Circuits on the one hand and the Third Circuit on the other. 
A.  The Eleventh Circuit 
Beginning in 2004, the Eleventh Circuit decided several cases in-
terpreting the Equal Terms provision of RLUIPA.  Before this Section 
lays out the Eleventh Circuit’s doctrinal tests, it is helpful to note the 
three kinds of potential Equal Terms statutory violations, as defined by 
the Eleventh Circuit.  A land-use regulation will violate RLUIPA if it is 
(1) a statute that facially differentiates between religious and nonreli-
gious assemblies or institutions; (2) a facially neutral statute that is nev-
ertheless “gerrymandered” to place a burden solely on religious, as op-
posed to nonreligious, assemblies or institutions; or (3) a truly neutral 
statute that is selectively enforced against religious, as opposed to nonre-
ligious[,] assemblies or institutions.85 
These classifications parallel the standard types of governmental 
action that cause a violation of the Free Exercise Clause.  Midrash Se-
phardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside addresses the first type of violation,86 
while Konikov v. Orange County87 and Primera Iglesia Bautista of Boca Ra-
ton, Inc. v. Broward County88 address the third type.  The second type of 
 
84 See Daniel P. Lennington, Thou Shalt Not Zone:  The Overbroad Applications and 
Troubling Implications of RLUIPA’s Land Use Provisions, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 805, 815 
(2006) (“This second part [RLUIPA’s Discrimination and Exclusion provisions] has been 
infrequently applied and seldom used by plaintiffs.  Moreover, it has generally not been 
attacked in the courts as either overbroad or unconstitutional.” (footnote omitted)). 
85 Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward County, 450 
F.3d 1295, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006). 
86 See 366 F.3d 1214, 1220 & n.3 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that churches and syn-
agogues were expressly prohibited in the business district); see also Primera, 450 F.3d at 
1311 n.11 (stating that Midrash involved a facial Equal Terms challenge). 
87 See 410 F.3d 1317, 1329 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (holding that the Orange 
County zoning code as implemented by the county violated RLUIPA); see also Primera, 450 
F.3d at 1311 n.11 (stating that Konikov decided an as-applied Equal Terms challenge). 
88 See 450 F.3d at 1310 (stating that Primera “essentially claim[ed]” the third type 
of Equal Terms violation). 
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violation contemplates cases similar to the situation brought to the Su-
preme Court in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.89 
The first, and perhaps the most influential, Eleventh Circuit case 
interpreting the Equal Terms provision, Midrash, involved a zoning 
ordinance promulgated by the town of Surfside, Florida.90  The ordin-
ance contained a provision excluding churches and synagogues from 
Surfside’s business district, while private clubs and lodges were per-
mitted above the first floor.91  Two synagogues wishing to locate in the 
business district challenged the zoning ordinance as facially discrimi-
natory under the Equal Terms provision of RLUIPA.92  Churches and 
synagogues were prohibited in seven of the eight zoning districts in 
Surfside; indeed, they were only permitted in the “RD-1 two-family res-
idential district,” and even then only with a conditional-use permit.93  
The synagogues argued that it would be burdensome to locate in the 
RD-1 district because Orthodox Judaism requires its practitioners to 
walk to religious services.94  Surfside, however, argued that the ordin-
ance was necessary “to invigorate the business district and to create a 
strong tax base”;95 a synagogue ostensibly would be tax exempt.  The 
Eleventh Circuit invalidated the zoning ordinance, holding that 
“churches and synagogues, as well as private clubs and lodges, fall with-
in the natural perimeter of ‘assembly or institution.’”96  Since Surfside’s 
goal of “retail synergy” was pursued against religious assemblies but not 
other noncommercial assemblies, the court found that the town had 
impermissibly preferred secular motivations to religious ones.97 
According to the Midrash court, while the Equal Terms provision 
“has the ‘feel’ of an equal protection law, it lacks the ‘similarly si-
tuated’ requirement usually found in equal protection analysis.”98  
Looking to the ordinary meanings of “assembly” and “institution,” the 
court reasoned that a proper inquiry must first determine whether the 
church or synagogue “qualifies as an ‘assembly or institution,’” then 
determine “whether the governmental authority treats [it] differently 
 
89 See 508 U.S. 520, 535 (1993) (“It becomes evident that these ordinances target 
Santeria sacrifice when the ordinances’ operation is considered.”). 
90 366 F.3d at 1219. 
91 Id. at 1220. 
92 Id. at 1218-19. 
93 Id. at 1219. 
94 Id. at 1221. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 1231. 
97 Id. at 1235. 
98 Id. at 1229. 
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than a nonreligious assembly or institution.”99  Quoting Webster’s Dic-
tionary, the court defined “assembly” as “a company of persons col-
lected together in one place [usually] and usually for some common 
purpose (as deliberation and legislation, worship, or social entertain-
ment).”100  “Institution” was defined to mean “an established society or 
corporation:  an establishment or foundation esp[ecially] of a public 
character,” or “[a]n established organization, esp[ecially] one of a 
public character.”101 
Under the Midrash rule, upon a finding of unequal treatment of 
religious and nonreligious assemblies or institutions, the court will au-
tomatically find a violation of the Equal Terms provision, regardless of 
any justification supplied by the zoning authority.102  Once a violation 
of the Equal Terms provision is found, the regulation in question is by 
definition deemed not neutral or not generally applicable “because 
such unequal treatment indicates the ordinance improperly targets 
the religious character of an assembly.”103  Because it is relatively easy 
to prove a violation of the Equal Terms provision under the Midrash 
approach, however, a finding that the challenged regulation is either 
not neutral or not generally applicable does not translate into auto-
matic invalidation of the regulation.  Rather, upon the finding of a vi-
olation, the regulation must pass the test of strict scrutiny.104  In order 
for the law to survive, the governmental entity must demonstrate a 
compelling justification for the classification and that the classification 
is narrowly tailored to the government’s interest.105 
The Eleventh Circuit next visited RLUIPA’s Equal Terms provi-
sion in 2005.  In Konikov v. Orange County, the court confronted a Cha-
bad rabbi holding services and Torah study meetings out of his 
home.106  His home was located in an R-1A residential district, in which 
a landowner was required to submit a $912 application to the zoning 
board for a special exception if she wished to operate a religious organ-
 
99 Id. at 1230. 
100 Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
101 Id. at 1230-31 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
102 See id. at 1231 (“Because we have concluded that private clubs, churches and 
synagogues fall under the umbrella of ‘assembly or institution’ as those terms are used 
in RLUIPA, this differential treatment constitutes a violation of § (b)(1) of RLUIPA.”). 
103 Id. at 1232. 
104 Id.  It should be noted that the strict scrutiny that the Eleventh Circuit applies 
to the classification determines whether the challenged regulation should be invali-
dated, not whether there was a violation of the Equal Terms provision in the first place. 
105 Id. 
106 410 F.3d 1317, 1319-20 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). 
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ization.107  Konikov never applied for a special exception.108  When 
Orange County cited him for violation of the zoning code, Konikov 
sued, raising facial and as-applied challenges to the zoning code under 
RLUIPA’s Equal Terms provision.109 
In assessing the distinctions made by the Orange County zoning 
code (i.e., the facial challenge), the court applied the Midrash test and 
found that the only permitted secular use in the R-1A zone that might 
qualify as an assembly or institution was family day-care centers.110  
Nonetheless, the court held that even if family day-care centers could 
qualify as assemblies or institutions, the state had a compelling justifi-
cation for treating family day-care centers differently from other 
groups because of the “fundamental right to freedom of personal 
choice in marriage and family life.”111  The court also found that be-
cause the classification was narrowly tailored to that interest, it could 
survive strict scrutiny.112 
In assessing the implementation of the Orange County zoning 
code (i.e., the as-applied challenge), however, the Eleventh Circuit 
held that the county had violated the Equal Terms provision of RLUI-
PA and that its classification could not survive strict scrutiny.113  The 
court was deeply troubled by the fact that “a group meeting with the 
same frequency as Konikov’s would not violate the Code, so long as reli-
gion is not discussed.”114  As a result, it found that Orange County’s en-
forcement of the zoning code impermissibly targeted religious assem-
blies without a compelling justification.115 
The last stop on our tour of Eleventh Circuit jurisprudence is the 
case of Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward 
County.116  Primera, a Hispanic Baptist congregation, purchased land 
in the A-1 Agricultural Estate district, on which it planned to build a 
 
107 Id. at 1320. 
108 Id. at 1321. 
109 Id. at 1321, 1324. 
110 Id. at 1325-26. 
111 Id. at 1326; see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) 
(plurality opinion) (“This Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice 
in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. 
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974))). 
112 Konikov, 410 F.3d at 1327. 
113 Id. at 1329. 
114 Id. at 1328. 
115 Id. at 1329. 
116 450 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2006). 
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church.117  The land, however, was situated within 1000 feet of other 
nonresidential, nonagricultural uses, in violation of a separation re-
quirement applicable to the A-1 district.118  The “stated purpose” of 
this requirement was “to protect, preserve and enhance the rural cha-
racter and lifestyle of the existing low density areas.”119  On the advice 
of counsel, Primera applied for a zoning variance, which was denied 
by the Board of Adjustment twice, but continued to hold services in 
violation of the separation requirement.120  Primera then brought suit 
under the Equal Terms provision of RLUIPA, claiming that the Bro-
ward County Preparatory School, a secular institution located in the 
same A-1 district, had been granted rezoning.121  The Eleventh Circuit 
held that Primera had not demonstrated a violation of the Equal 
Terms provision because it had failed to present a similarly situated 
secular comparator.122  The court found that the school was not simi-
larly situated to Primera because “they sought markedly different 
forms of zoning relief, from different decision-making bodies, under 
sharply different provisions of local law.”123 
In its reasoning, the court revisited its holding in Konikov.  Noting 
that Konikov involved an as-applied challenge to a land-use regulation, 
the court stated that Konikov “stands for the proposition that a neutral 
statute’s application may violate the Equal Terms provision if it diffe-
rentially treats similarly situated religious and nonreligious assem-
blies.”124  This is a more stringent standard than the Midrash rule, 
which requires only that the religious assembly or institution present a 
better-treated secular entity that falls into the “natural perimeter” of 
“assembly or institution.”125  The Eleventh Circuit found that in an as-
applied challenge, the Konikov court had engaged in a similarly si-
tuated analysis; it thus ruled that Konikov controlled in the as-applied 
context.126  The court’s primary concern in Primera was that religious 
 
117 Id. at 1300. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
120 Id. at 1301-02. 
121 Id.  Note that Primera had applied to the Board of Adjustment for a zoning va-
riance.  The Broward County Preparatory School, on the other hand, had applied to the 
county for rezoning, a different remedy administered by a different board.  Id. at 1300-02. 
122 Id. at 1313. 
123 Id. at 1311. 
124 Id. 
125 See Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1230 & n.12 
(11th Cir. 2004) (describing Justice Harlan’s “natural perimeter” test). 
126 Primera, 450 F.3d at 1311 n.11. 
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entities be given “equal treatment, not special treatment,” under 
RLUIPA’s Equal Terms provision.127 
The Eleventh Circuit’s construction of RLUIPA’s Equal Terms 
provision is the most comprehensive we have.  The Seventh and Third 
Circuit opinions in this area largely respond to the precedent set by 
the Eleventh Circuit. 
B.  The Seventh Circuit 
The Seventh Circuit has heard two major cases construing the 
Equal Terms provision of RLUIPA.  In the first of those cases, Vision 
Church v. Village of Long Grove, a Korean congregation owned land in 
unincorporated Lake County, Illinois, on which it planned to build a 
church.128  The congregation, however, wanted the church to be with-
in the boundaries of the Village of Long Grove proper, not in unin-
corporated Lake County, so it applied for voluntary annexation into 
the Village of Long Grove.129  Church use was permitted on the prop-
erty under Lake County’s Zoning Code but not under the Village’s 
without a special-use permit; therefore, the church made its applica-
tion for annexation conditional on the grant of a special-use permit.130  
Citing concerns about the size of the church and Vision’s refusal to 
assent to other conditions desired by the Village, the Village denied 
Vision’s application for annexation.131 
At the same time, a local real estate developer whose property sur-
rounded Vision’s property on all sides applied for voluntary annexa-
tion.132  After denying Vision’s application, the Village quickly ap-
proved the developer’s and then took advantage of a provision of 
Illinois law allowing a municipality to involuntarily annex property sur-
rounded on all sides by property within the Village’s boundaries.133  
The Village zoned Vision’s property “R2 Residential,” as requested by 
Vision, but the involuntary annexation terminated Vision’s applica-
tion for the requisite special-use permit to operate as a church.134  
Shortly thereafter, the Village amended its Assembly Ordinance to re-
 
127 Id. at 1313. 
128 468 F.3d 975, 981 (7th Cir. 2006). 
129 Id. at 981-82. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 982. 
132 Id. at 983. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 983 & n.5. 
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strict the size of buildings used for public assembly.135  Vision later 
reapplied for a special-use permit, but the permit was denied because 
the size of the proposed facility exceeded the permissible square foo-
tage under the Assembly Ordinance.136  Although the Seventh Circuit 
cited Konikov for the proposition that a religious group and a nonreli-
gious group need not be similarly situated in all relevant respects for 
purposes of the Equal Terms provision comparison, it did not hold for 
Vision.137  Arguing that elementary schools were exempt from the re-
quirement, Vision apparently had challenged only the special-use 
permit requirement, not the questionable Assembly Ordinance.138  As 
a result, the court found Vision’s comparison to elementary schools 
unpersuasive under the rules of Konikov and Primera.139  The court 
held that Vision had not demonstrated an Equal Terms statutory vi-
olation as defined in Primera.140 
The next case to examine the Equal Terms provision in the Se-
venth Circuit was Digrugilliers v. Consolidated City of Indianapolis.141  In 
that case, the Baptist Church of the West Side had been conducting 
church services out of a building zoned “C-1.”142  Under Indianapolis’s 
zoning code, the church’s building was considered a “religious use,” 
which was not permitted in a C-1 district without a zoning variance.143  
Various secular assemblies and institutions, along with their corres-
ponding commercial accessory uses, were allowed in the C-1 district 
without a variance.144  The Pastor did not apply for a zoning variance; 
instead, he brought suit alleging that “the requirement of obtaining a 
variance in order to make a religious use of land” violated the Equal 
Terms provision of RLUIPA.145  The district court held for the city, 
reasoning that because the zoning code permitted religious land users 
to enjoy certain residential uses (e.g., use of a rectory for the minister), 
allowing religious use in the C-1 district without a variance would give 
 
135 Id. at 983-84. 
136 Id. at 984. 
137 Id. at 1002-03. 
138 Id. at 1003. 
139 Id.  
140 See id. (“[T]he fact that Vision and the elementary schools were subject to dif-
ferent standards because of the year in which their special use applications were consi-
dered compels the conclusion that there was no unequal treatment.”). 
141 506 F.3d 612 (7th Cir. 2007). 
142 Id. at 614. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 614-15. 
145 Id. at 614. 
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religious entities “rights greater than rather than equal to” those of 
secular entities.146  In an opinion by Judge Posner, however, the Se-
venth Circuit vindicated the church.  The court held that 
the City may not, by defining religious use so expansively as to bestow on 
churches in districts in which it allows them to operate more rights than 
identical secular users of land have, justify excluding churches from dis-




To hold otherwise, reasoned Judge Posner, would be to allow local 
governments to zone out religious entities simply by defining religious 
use to permit an activity forbidden for secular use in the same zone.148  
Vision and Digrugilliers thus exemplify the Seventh Circuit’s willingness 
to follow the Eleventh Circuit’s lead in construing the Equal Terms 
provision of RLUIPA.149 
C.  The Third Circuit 
The Third Circuit has explicitly repudiated the Seventh and Ele-
venth Circuits in its leading case interpreting the Equal Terms provi-
sion, Lighthouse Institute for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch.150  In 
Lighthouse, “a Christian church . . . seek[ing] to minister to the poor 
and disadvantaged in downtown Long Branch, New Jersey,” purchased 
property in the C-1 Central Commercial District.151  Assembly halls and 
theaters were permitted in the C-1 district, but churches were not.152  
Lighthouse sought permission to use its property for religious purpos-
es but was only allowed to use it as an office.153  Lighthouse sued for a 
preliminary injunction, attacking the ordinance both facially and as 
 
146 Id. at 615. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Indeed, although the Seventh Circuit has not issued an opinion interpreting 
the Equal Terms provision since the circuit split emerged, the U.S. District Court for 
the Northern District of Illinois has opined that the Eleventh Circuit’s approach is 
more consistent with Digrugilliers than it is with the Third Circuit’s approach, in terms 
of the appropriateness of considering protective zones in Equal Terms provision analy-
sis.  See River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, No. 08-0950, 2008 WL 
4865568, at *7 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2008) (noting that the Seventh Circuit cited appro-
vingly to the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit in at least two prior cases).  The Seventh 
Circuit also has not examined the standard of review applicable to a challenged regula-
tion upon a finding of unequal treatment. 
150 510 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2007). 
151 Id. at 256-57 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
152 Id. at 257. 
153 Id. 
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applied.154  All claims were dismissed as either unexhausted or unripe, 
and the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a prelimi-
nary injunction.155 
While this litigation was pending, Long Branch adopted a redeve-
lopment plan that “strictly limited the use of properties within the 
‘Broadway Corridor’ area,” where the church’s property was located.156  
The plan superseded the ordinance and was adopted in order to in-
crease retail revenues for business owners and tax revenues for the 
city.157  Churches were not permitted in the Broadway Corridor.158  
Lighthouse tried to qualify as a developer so as to retain the ability to 
make use of its property, but this request was denied by the City 
Council because “a church would ‘destroy the ability of the block to 
be used as a high end entertainment and recreation area’ due to a 
New Jersey statute which prohibits the issuance of liquor licenses with-
in two hundred feet of a house of worship.”159  Lighthouse then chal-
lenged the plan as violative of the Equal Terms provision of RLUIPA.160 
 The Third Circuit held that “a religious plaintiff under the Equal 
Terms Provision must identify a better-treated secular comparator that 
is similarly situated in regard to the objectives of the challenged regu-
lation”—something Lighthouse had not, and perhaps could not have, 
done.161  The court further held that when a violation of the Equal 
Terms provision is found, the standard should be strict liability, not 
strict scrutiny.162  As a result, the court upheld summary judgment for 
Long Branch with respect to the plan, finding that the plan did not 
 
154 Id. 
155 Id.; see also Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 100 F. 
App’x 70, 77 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that Lighthouse’s Equal Terms claim had failed 
because Lighthouse did not present a similarly situated secular comparator and be-
cause it was unclear whether its property would have been approved for church use 
had it applied as an “assembly hall”). 
156 Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 258. 
157 Id. 
158 See id. (“Churches were not listed as a permitted use . . . [and] the Plan pro-
vided that ‘[a]ny uses not specifically listed’ were prohibited.”). 
159 Id. at 259. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 268, 277 (emphasis omitted). 
162 Id. at 269.  This standard differs from the Eleventh Circuit test laid out in Mi-
drash.  Under the Third Circuit’s test, the religious plaintiff must first produce a better-
treated secular assembly or institution that is similarly situated as to the purpose of the 
regulation at issue.  If the court decides that the secular group is both similarly situated 
and better treated than the religious group, the government will be held strictly liable 
for violation of the Equal Terms provision.  Note that this approach entirely bypasses 
the compelling interest (or strict scrutiny) test that RLUIPA seeks to revive. 
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violate the Equal Terms provision.163  The court found that although 
the plan permitted nonreligious assemblies such as theaters in the 
Broadway Corridor, it did not permit any secular “assemblies or insti-
tutions whose presence would cause no lesser harm to the redevelop-
ment and revitalization of the Corridor” than the church.164  The court 
stressed the difficulty of creating a vibrant downtown if “sizeable areas 
of the Broadway Corridor were not available for the issuance of liquor 
licenses.”165  The Third Circuit, however, reversed the grant of summary 
judgment for Long Branch on the ordinance issue and then ordered 
summary judgment for Lighthouse; it found that the ordinance violated 
RLUIPA’s Equal Terms provision because, during discovery, the term 
“assembly hall” was determined not to encompass religious use.166 
The court reasoned that the Equal Terms provision requires 
something more than just the “identif[ication] [of] any nonreligious 
assembly or institution that enjoys better terms”:  one must consider 
the objectives of the regulation as well as the characteristics of the se-
cular and religious comparators.167  The court asserted that Congress 
had intended to codify existing Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence, 
which—as the court described in painstaking detail—required com-
paring how a regulation treated secular entities or behaviors that had 
the same effect on the regulation’s objectives.168  The Third Circuit 
expressly declined to adopt the Eleventh Circuit’s “expansive” reading 
of the statute because, according to the court, such a reading would 
assume “that Congress intended to force local governments to give 
any and all religious entities a free pass to locate wherever any secular 
assembly or institution is allowed.”169 
 
163 Id. at 272. 
164 Id. at 270. 
165 Id. at 270-71.  Under a state statute, liquor licenses could not be issued “in the 
vicinity of houses of worship.”  Id. 
166 Id. at 272-73. 
167 Id. at 264. 
168 Id. at 264-65. 
169 Id. at 268, 269 n.14.  Since the Third Circuit’s opinion in Lighthouse was handed 
down, two relevant district court opinions have discussed it in detail.  In Third Church of 
Christ v. City of New York, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York 
analyzed the plaintiff’s claim under the Eleventh Circuit, Seventh Circuit, and Third 
Circuit tests and decided that the Equal Terms provision was violated under all three.  
617 F. Supp. 2d 201, 209-11 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).  The court thus refused to express an 
opinion as to which test would prevail in the Second Circuit.  Id.  In Centro Familiar 
Cristiano Buenas Nuevas v. City of Yuma, the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizo-
na did not apply the similarly situated secular comparator test of Lighthouse; rather, it 
focused on the Eleventh Circuit’s and the Third Circuit’s invocations of principles of 
neutrality and general applicability to deny the religious institution’s Equal Terms 
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In fashioning its doctrinal test, the majority opinion focused more 
heavily on Third Circuit Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence than on 
the statutory text.  Judge Jordan, in his dissent, capitalized on precise-
ly this point.  As Judge Jordan succinctly put it, “In less legalistic lan-
guage, we are asked whether religion can be made to take a back seat 
to a City’s economic development goals.”170  The dissent took notice of 
the majority’s fear that the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation would 
“make rational zoning impossible whenever a church was in the mix,” 
but it responded by arguing that RLUIPA does no more than prevent 
a religious assembly or institution from being excluded when a secular 
assembly or institution is allowed.171 
Judge Jordan also took issue with the majority’s analysis because, 
although Congress intended to codify parts of Free Exercise Clause ju-
risprudence when it enacted RLUIPA, it did not necessarily mean to 
replicate that analysis completely.172  For Judge Jordan, the starting 
point of the majority’s analysis should have been the text of the statute 
that Congress chose to enact.173  The dissent also correctly pointed out 
that RLUIPA was enacted using Congress’s Section 5 power, under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, to enforce the Free Exercise Clause and that 
importing a similarly situated secular comparator requirement would 
in fact frustrate that intent by making the Act harder to enforce.174  In 
sum, the dissent concluded that there was no legitimate basis for the 
majority’s grafting of additional requirements onto the statute. 
III.  WHY THE MIDRASH APPROACH PROVIDES THE BEST INTERPRETIVE 
FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF  
EQUAL TERMS CHALLENGES 
Undoubtedly, religious entities’ land uses create thorny and con-
troversial issues.  For example, a common argument against RLUIPA’s 
land-use provisions is that they permit religious groups to wantonly 
 
challenge.  See 615 F. Supp. 2d 980, 996-1000 (D. Ariz. 2009) (holding that the city had 
shown that a neutral and generally applicable principle justified its conditional-use 
permit requirement for religious and similar secular groups, thus qualifying the city’s 
regulation for rational basis review). 
170 Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 278 ( Jordan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
171 Id. at 286. 
172 See id. at 287-88 (“Viewing a RLUIPA claim as the precise equivalent of a Free 
Exercise Claim renders the statute superfluous.”). 
173 Id. at 288. 
174 Id. at 293-94. 
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flout generally applicable land-use regulations.175  Indeed, some courts 
seem to find the Equal Terms provision itself objectionable.  Their ar-
guments imply that RLUIPA does not seek to treat religious entities 
on equal terms with nonreligious entities but rather to treat religious 
assemblies and institutions better than their secular counterparts.176  
Given these concerns, the Midrash approach best reconciles the com-
peting interests of religious and secular groups.  Furthermore, of all 
the interpretive approaches to Equal Terms challenges detailed above, 
the interpretation of the Midrash court is most consistent with the text 
and purpose of RLUIPA. 
To prevent what it perceived to be a potential constitutional prob-
lem,177 the Third Circuit imposed more stringent requirements on re-
ligious plaintiffs than those found in the text of RLUIPA.  The Third 
Circuit’s approach is two-pronged:  First, it prevents religious plaintiffs 
from stating a claim under the Equal Terms provision unless they can 
demonstrate that there exists a secular assembly or institution similarly 
situated to the religious entity as to the purpose of the challenged reg-
ulation.  Second, if unequal treatment is established, the government 
is held strictly liable for violating the statute.  Likewise, in Primera, the 
Eleventh Circuit read a similarly situated requirement into Konikov.178  
The question remains, however, whether the best interpretive ap-
proach to remedy a perceived injustice is to rewrite the text of a sta-
tute constitutionally passed by both houses of Congress and signed in-
to law by the President. 
The Third Circuit is not alone in its concern that statutes like 
RLUIPA in fact confer more rights on religious entities than on their 
secular counterparts.  Hamilton argues in God vs. the Gavel that home-
 
175 See, e.g., Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Judicial Review of Local Land Use Decisions:  Les-
sons from RLUIPA, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 717, 738 (2008) (“To others, RLUIPA 
unnecessarily interferes with local governments’ ability to enforce generally applicable 
land use regulation and creates an overly broad exemption that allows religious institu-
tions to avoid a community’s reasonable land-use concerns.”). 
176 See supra text accompanying note 169 (noting the Third Circuit’s concern that 
such an interpretation could “force local governments to give any and all religious ent-
ities a free pass” in location decisions). 
177 See Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 267 n.11 (declining to reach the question of RLUI-
PA’s constitutionality under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Camp-
bell, supra note 14, at 1089 (“Even though Long Branch failed to argue that the equal 
terms provision would be unconstitutional under the interpretation advanced by Ligh-
thouse . . . , the court nevertheless included a lengthy footnote explaining that its limit-
ing construction avoided concerns about the constitutionality of the provision.”). 
178 See Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward County, 450 
F.3d 1295, 1311 n.11 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Konikov[] decided an as-applied Equal Terms 
challenge by engaging in a similarly situated analysis.”). 
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owners have reason to fear that they will “go to sleep in a quiet resi-
dential enclave and wake up next door to a proposed 150-car parking 
lot” without meaningful recourse to the courts.179  Similar statements 
abound in the literature examining RLUIPA.180  Fortunately, however, 
such fears are unfounded.  The Midrash test, which does not add a si-
milarly situated requirement and relies on strict scrutiny of the chal-
lenged regulation upon a finding of unequal treatment, is more than 
adequate to the task. 
A.  The Circuit Split 
The federal appellate court decisions construing the Equal Terms 
provision essentially create a two-pronged doctrinal framework.181  The 
Eleventh Circuit and the Third Circuit apply different standards un-
der each prong of the analysis.  In order to state a claim under the 
Equal Terms provision, the religious plaintiff must show that there is 
(1) a land-use regulation, (2) a religious assembly or institution, (3) a 
nonreligious assembly or institution, and (4) some evidence that the 
nonreligious entity is better treated.  The standard applicable to each 
prong has an enormous effect on the outcome in a given case. 
The first prong involves determining whether the case includes 
the requisite entities and whether the secular entity is treated better 
than the religious one.  The Eleventh Circuit maintains that, at least 
in a facial challenge, the plaintiff need only produce one religious and 
one secular assembly or institution, as defined by Webster; if the secu-
lar one is treated better than the religious one, unequal treatment is 
established.182  The Third Circuit, on the other hand, maintains that 
Congress could not possibly have meant to include all secular assem-
blies or institutions in the comparison; only those assemblies or insti-
tutions that are similarly situated to the religious plaintiff with respect 
 
179 HAMILTON, supra note 56, at 79; see also id. at 78-82 (cataloguing the problems 
of parking, traffic, lights, and noise that the modern religious congregation imposes 
on suburbs). 
180 See, e.g., Lennington, supra note 84, at 805 (creating a hypothetical in which a 
pastor purchases a home next door to the reader’s with plans to raze it in order to 
build his dream church). 
181 See Campbell, supra note 14, at 1085-86.  For simplicity, I compare the Eleventh 
Circuit’s approach with the Third Circuit’s, because the Seventh Circuit followed the 
Eleventh Circuit on the first prong and has not yet addressed the second prong. 
182 Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1230-31 (11th 
Cir. 2004). 
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to the purpose of the challenged regulation are relevant.183  To take 
the Lighthouse example, if a liquor license cannot be issued within 500 
feet of a church or school, and a zoning regulation excludes only 
churches from a zone for this reason, the religious plaintiff cannot 
produce the Rotary Club as an example of a better-treated secular ent-
ity.  The Rotary Club does not affect liquor licensing in the zone.  In-
stead, the church must produce a better-treated school because a 
school would also interrupt liquor licensing.  A school is the only secu-
lar entity that is similarly situated to the church as to the purpose of 
the challenged regulation, which is to avoid liquor-licensing interrup-
tions and create a vibrant downtown.  The standard employed at this 
stage matters because it determines which plaintiffs will be able to 
state a claim.  In the Eleventh Circuit, more plaintiffs get through the 
door; in the Third Circuit, very few can pass. 
The second prong involves the standard of review applied to the 
challenged land-use regulation.  The Eleventh Circuit applies strict 
scrutiny.184  The court examines the government’s justifications for the 
regulation in great detail because more plaintiffs cross the threshold 
under the first prong.  If the regulation fails strict scrutiny, it is invali-
dated; if the government demonstrates a narrowly tailored compelling 
interest, it stands.  The Third Circuit, on the other hand, does not ap-
ply strict scrutiny.  Because it is so difficult to get through the door 
under the first prong, if a plaintiff can prove unequal treatment under 
the similarly situated test, the challenged regulation is automatically 
invalidated.185 
It appears that the second prong of the Equal Terms test is the 
operative one in the Eleventh Circuit, while the first prong is instru-
mental in the Third Circuit.  In the Eleventh Circuit, it is easy for the 
religious plaintiff to get through the door under the first prong (at 
least in a facial challenge), but the government gets a chance to prove 
that it has a compelling interest under the second prong.  In the 
Third Circuit, it is very difficult for the religious plaintiff to get 
through the door under the first prong, but if it does, it wins under 
the second prong. 
Lighthouse deals a significant blow to religious entities seeking to 
exercise their statutory rights under RLUIPA by creating the require-
ment that a religious assembly or institution produce not only a bet-
 
183 Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 266 
(3d Cir. 2007). 
184 Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1232. 
185 See Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 269. 
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ter-treated secular assembly or institution but also one that is similarly 
situated as to the purpose of the challenged regulation.  The eventual 
resolution of this circuit split by the Supreme Court would ultimately 
clear up this doctrinal confusion by determining which interpretation 
of RLUIPA’s Equal Terms provision should prevail. 
B.  The Similarly Situated Secular Comparator Requirement 
The Third Circuit argued that without the similarly situated secu-
lar comparator requirement, religious entities will be immune from 
land-use regulation.  A textual interpretation of RLUIPA’s Equal Terms 
provision, however, does not allow religious assemblies and institutions 
to locate wherever they please.  It does not absolve religious entities 
from compliance with neutral and generally applicable186 special-permit 
and variance requirements.187  It simply prevents local governments 
from discriminating against religious assemblies and institutions by 
excluding or hampering them when secular assemblies and institu-
tions are not so burdened.188  Therefore, the fearful homeowner in 
Hamilton’s hypothetical need worry that a strange new church and its 
150-space parking lot could one day set up shop next door only if the 
local Rotary Club189 would be permitted to do the same.  So long as 
the Rotary Club is excluded, the church may be excluded as well.  
Contrary to the opinion of RLUIPA’s detractors, the church will not 
be permitted to flout applicable land-use regulations and locate whe-
rever it pleases. 
1.  The Third Circuit’s Fears 
The Third Circuit was reluctant to give the Equal Terms provision 
a broad construction in Lighthouse because it believed that such a 
“reading of the statute would lead to the conclusion that Congress in-
 
186 The challenged requirement in Digrugilliers was not generally applicable; ra-
ther, only religious land users had to apply for a zoning variance in order to make use 
of their land.  See Digrugilliers v. Consol. City of Indianapolis, 506 F.3d 612, 614 (7th 
Cir. 2007) (“A religious use is forbidden in C-1 districts without a zoning variance.”). 
187 Neutral and generally applicable laws do not admit of religious exemption.  See 
supra text accompanying note 48. 
188 See Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1242 (11th Cir. 
2004) (“While RLUIPA may preempt laws that discriminate against or exclude reli-
gious institutions entirely, it leaves individual states free to eliminate the discrimination 
in any way they choose, so long as the discrimination is actually eliminated.”). 
189 The Rotary Club is an international community service organization.  Rotary 
Int’l, History of Rotary International, http://www.rotary.org/en/AboutUs/History/ 
RIHistory/Pages/ridefault.aspx (last visited Nov. 15, 2009). 
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tended to force local governments to give any and all religious entities 
a free pass to locate wherever any secular institution or assembly is al-
lowed.”190  Recent trends in religious land use have some courts and 
commentators worried that special treatment for religion will become 
the rule.  In Hamilton’s view, for example, religious land use has un-
dergone a “paradigm shift” in recent years.  Hamilton argues that 
[u]nfortunately for their neighbors, although favorable for the reci-
pients of their services, contemporary houses of worship . . . are now a 
locus for social services, as well as a center for worship and entertain-
ment.  The thriving religious entities have sizeable buildings, with seat-
ing for hundreds—maybe thousands, along with heavy traffic, intense 
parking needs, and even bus transportation into the neighborhood from 
off site.191 
This statement is undoubtedly true.  Houses of worship have cer-
tainly expanded in recent years, thus creating all of the benefits and 
drawbacks associated with large groups of people congregating in one 
place.  What is puzzling, however, is why problems of building size, 
parking, and traffic are bemoaned as though they apply only to reli-
gious land use and not to the land use of secular assemblies or institu-
tions.  The peculiar problems associated with religious land use are in 
fact issues confronted wherever land is used by a sizeable assembly or 
institution.192  Secular assemblies and institutions require buildings, a 
physical plant, and parking.  If secular assemblies and institutions are 
thus permitted while religious ones are excluded, then the problems 
such exclusion seeks to address will remain unsolved. 
As a result, the Third Circuit’s fear that an Equal Terms provision 
without a similarly situated secular comparator requirement will make 
rational zoning impossible is also unfounded.  A municipality wishing 
entirely to prevent a church from locating in a particular district need 
only ban all other secular assemblies and institutions.193 
 
190 Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 268. 
191 HAMILTON, supra note 5657, at 79. 
192 See 146 CONG. REC. 16,698 (2000) ( joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. 
Kennedy on RLUIPA) (“Churches have been denied the right to meet in rented store-
fronts, in abandoned schools, in converted funeral homes, theaters, and skating 
rinks—in all sorts of buildings that were permitted when they generated traffic for se-
cular purposes.”). 
193 A related concern is that an Equal Terms provision without a similarly situated 
requirement would be unconstitutionally overbroad under Boerne.  For a discussion of 
why a textual interpretation of the Equal Terms provision would be constitutional un-
der Boerne, see Campbell, supra note 14, at 1094-99. 
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The Lighthouse court, however, remained troubled by what it saw 
as a slippery slope, arguing that according to the Eleventh Circuit, 
if a town allows a local, ten-member book club to meet in the senior cen-
ter, it must also permit a large church with a thousand members—or . . . 
a religious assembly with rituals involving sacrificial killings of animals or 
the participation of wild bears—to locate in the same neighborhood re-
gardless of the impact such a religious entity might have on the envi-
sioned character of the area.
194
 
This comparison seems inapposite.  If a thousand-member book 
club would not be allowed in a particular zone, a thousand-member 
church could not credibly claim that it is being treated on less than 
equal terms, even if the ten-member book club would be allowed.195  
On the other hand, if a thousand-member book club would be al-
lowed in the zone, the church should not be penalized for the fact 
that the book club currently has only ten members.  The similarly si-
tuated requirement strives to make explicit the fact that a thousand-
member church should not necessarily be treated the same way as a 
ten-member book club, at least in an as-applied Equal Terms chal-
lenge.  The Midrash test, however, achieves the same result while 
doing less damage to the statutory text. 
Lighthouse makes it harder for plaintiffs to assert their rights under 
a statute enacted to protect them but easier for judges to achieve their 
own desired policy results.  In Lighthouse, Long Branch argued that 
“churches are by their nature not likely to foster the kind of extended-
hours traffic and synergetic spending it wishes to foster in the Broad-
way Corridor”196 and that the New Jersey liquor laws “would hinder the 
development of the kind of modern entertainment-oriented district 
that Long Branch envisages.”197  Lighthouse offered to waive its right 
to enforce the liquor laws in perpetuity, but because each new licen-
see would require a new waiver, the court rejected this as giving the 
church “unacceptable control over the development of the downtown 
area.”198  As a result, while secular assemblies and institutions such as 
 
194 Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 268 (citations omitted). 
195 Some might argue that a judge would feel constrained to apply the text of this 
statute to sanction such an absurd result, but even the “plain meaning” rule of statutory 
construction provides an exception for absurd results.  See infra subsection III.A.2. 
196 510 F.3d at 270. 
197 Id. 
198 Id. at 271.  It would of course be unconstitutional for Long Branch to pass a law 
giving religious authorities veto power over the issuance of liquor licenses, but a 
church’s voluntary waiver of its own rights under a statute seems like a different issue.  
See generally Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, 459 U.S. 116, 117, 127 (1982) (holding that a 
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theaters, performance venues, restaurants, bars, clubs, culinary 
schools, and dance studios were all permitted in the Broadway Corri-
dor, the church was not.199  By finding that the secular groups and the 
religious group were not similarly situated as to the regulatory pur-
pose, the court essentially found that the teaching of cooking skills or 
the worship of artists and musicians would cause less harm to Long 
Branch’s redevelopment goals than the teaching of life skills to the 
poor or the worship of God.  It would be difficult to argue, however, 
that Lighthouse was treated on equal terms with the array of secular 
groups permitted in the Broadway Corridor.200 
The Third Circuit’s test practically guaranteed Long Branch’s suc-
cess because only a religious entity or a school could cause the liquor-
licensing interruptions at issue in Lighthouse.  A secular assembly or in-
stitution other than a private school could never be similarly situated 
to Lighthouse in this respect.  The similarly situated requirement al-
lowed the Third Circuit to shut the door on Lighthouse’s claim with-
out passing on the justifications for Long Branch’s regulation.201  The 
Midrash test, however, likely would have found unequal treatment, 
leading to a violation of the Equal Terms provision, after which the 
burden would have shifted to the government to demonstrate a com-
pelling state interest and to prove that the classification was narrowly 
tailored to that interest.  Long Branch would have been less likely to 
succeed under this test, but it would have had a fair opportunity to 
show a compelling state interest.  More importantly, after application 
of the Midrash test, the text of the statute would remain a reliable 
guide for those who must obey Congress’s command. 
 
Massachusetts law giving churches and schools veto power over the issuance of liquor 
licenses to venues located within 500 feet of a church or school violates the Establish-
ment Clause). 
199 Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 270. 
200 Recall Judge Posner’s point in Digrugilliers:   
Government cannot, by granting churches special privileges (the right of a 
church official to reside in a building in a nonresidential district, or the right 
of the church to be free from offensive land uses in its vicinity), furnish the 
premise for excluding churches from otherwise suitable districts. 
Digrugilliers v. Consol. City of Indianapolis, 506 F.3d 612, 616 (7th Cir. 2007). 
201 See Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 270 (“We do not need to reach the question whether 
a church by its very nature is unlikely to contribute to the development of a vibrant 
and vital downtown . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Campbell, supra 
note 14, at 1101 (“[The Third Circuit’s interpretation] removed the government’s 
regulatory objectives from judicial scrutiny.”). 
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2.  Principles of Statutory Construction 
The Midrash test is also more consistent with the text and purpose 
of RLUIPA and further accords with accepted principles of statutory 
construction.  As Campbell notes, “courts may give a statute a narrow-
ing interpretation to preserve its constitutionality,”202 but Campbell 
argues that the use of this avoidance canon in Lighthouse was inappro-
priate in part because the Third Circuit’s interpretation contradicted 
congressional intent.203  The Third Circuit, as well as the Eleventh Cir-
cuit in Primera, departed from the statutory text in fashioning their 
doctrinal tests.  Although the issue is hotly contested in the academic 
literature, the Supreme Court has historically disfavored resort to leg-
islative history and other indicia of congressional intent when the text 
of a statute is clear.204  With the exception of the period between 1940 
and 1986, the Court has either criticized the use of legislative history 
in statutory interpretation or subscribed to what has become known as 
the “plain meaning” rule.205  The plain-meaning rule states that “where 
the language of an enactment is clear and construction according to 
its terms does not lead to absurd or impracticable consequences, the 
words employed are to be taken as the final expression of the mean-
ing intended.”206  Under the plain-meaning rule, resort to traditional 
indicia of legislative intent may be appropriate where the text of a sta-
tute is ambiguous, but not otherwise. 
The term “legislative intent,” however, may be something of a 
misnomer.  It is unclear whether it is possible to discern the “intent” 
 
202 Campbell, supra note 14, at 1094. 
203 Id. at 1094.  For Campbell’s full explanation of why the Third Circuit’s use of 
the avoidance canon was inappropriate, see id. at 1093-1105. 
204 See JOSEPH L. GERKEN, WHAT GOOD IS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY? 39-40 (2007) (de-
scribing the historical evolution of the Supreme Court’s treatment of legislative history 
in statutory interpretation). 
205 Id.  Between 1940 and 1986, the Court rejected the plain-meaning rule, hold-
ing in United States v. American Trucking Ass’ns that “[w]hen aid to construction of the 
meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no rule of 
law which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on superficial examina-
tion.”  310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940) (internal quotation marks omitted) (footnote omit-
ted).  Since then, the Supreme Court, spearheaded by the advocacy of Justice Scalia, 
has indicated its intent to return to the plain-meaning rule.  See, e.g., Hartford Under-
writers Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000) (stating the plain-
meaning rule as a legitimate approach to statutory interpretation).  But cf. WILLIAM N. 
ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 13 (1994) (arguing that “all ori-
ginalist theories fail” in part because “none of them adequately describes what Ameri-
can agencies and courts do when they interpret statutes”). 
206 United States v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929). 
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of a multimember body.207  What can be discerned, however, is the 
meaning of the statutory text that Congress voted to enact and that 
the President signed.  Indeed, the text may be the best indication of 
legislative intent.  While legislative history can be useful in parsing the 
language of unclear statutory text, such sources should be an aid to 
understanding the statute, not primary authority of equal weight.  
Where legislative history and clear statutory text conflict, the statutory 
text should always control.208 
The overriding problem with the Third Circuit’s test is that it libe-
rates courts from the text of the Equal Terms provision.  This is ap-
parent from the Lighthouse opinion itself.  When discussing the stan-
dard of review to be applied to the challenged land-use regulation, the 
Third Circuit stated that “[s]ince the Substantial Burden section in-
cludes a strict scrutiny provision and the Discrimination and Exclu-
sion section does not, we conclude this ‘disparate exclusion’ was part 
of the intent of Congress and not an oversight.”209  The court was not 
correspondingly troubled, however, by the lack of a similarly situated 
requirement in the text of the Equal Terms provision.  There, the 
court concluded, based on the intent of Congress and its own Free 
Exercise opinions, that a similarly situated requirement was mandated 
by the statute.210 
The text of RLUIPA’s Equal Terms provision does not contain a 
similarly situated requirement.211  Furthermore, the statute clearly 
states that it should be construed to the maximum breadth permissi-
 
207 The argument that “legislative intention is either undiscoverable or unpalatably 
selfish,” CHRISTIAN E. MAMMEN, USING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN AMERICAN STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 182 (2002), has been difficult to overcome.  See id. at 183 (arguing 
that even Justice Breyer has been unable to explain sufficiently why and how legislative 
purpose or intent should control statutory interpretation). 
208 See, e.g., Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 448 (7th Cir. 
2005) (“When a law sensibly could be read in multiple ways, legislative history may 
help a court understand which of these received the political branches’ imprimatur.  
But when the legislative history stands by itself, as a naked expression of ‘intent’ un-
connected to any enacted text, it has no more force than an opinion poll of legisla-
tors—less, really, as it speaks for fewer.”). 
209 Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 269 
(3d Cir. 2007). 
210 Id. at 264-68. 
211 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1) (2006) (“No government shall impose or imple-
ment a land use regulation in a manner that treats a religious assembly or institution 
on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution.”). 
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ble to protect religious exercise,212 which RLUIPA defines to include 
religious land use.213  In this case, the statutory command is clear:  “No 
government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a 
manner that treats a religious assembly or institution on less than 
equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution.”214  The Third 
Circuit, however, focused on the “intent” of Congress to codify Third 
Circuit Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence.215 
The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits duly noted that the statute 
clearly demands a comparison.  Otherwise, it would be impossible to 
know whether a religious assembly or institution was being treated on 
less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution.  But 
that is as far as the statute goes.  The Eleventh Circuit in Midrash un-
derstood the text to mean that a religious entity need only show that 
there exists a secular assembly or institution, similarly situated to the 
religious entity by virtue of its status as an assembly or institution, that is 
better treated on the face of a land-use regulation or by its application.  
In contrast, the Third Circuit ignored the statutory text, preferring to 
interpret Congress’s intent as codification of those Free Exercise Clause 
cases cited by the court.  Consequently, the Third Circuit, as well as the 
Eleventh Circuit in Primera, imported into RLUIPA with little textual 
support the similarly situated secular comparator requirement from 
judicial opinions construing the Equal Protection Clause.216 
Even if we were to rely on the legislative history of RLUIPA as our 
primary guide to statutory construction, the Midrash test is superior.  
The legislative history states that Congress intended to codify aspects, 
not all, of the existing Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence, and, as du-
ly noted in the Lighthouse dissent, Congress’s stated goal in enacting 
 
212 See id. § 2000cc-3(g) (“This chapter shall be construed in favor of a broad pro-
tection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this 
chapter and the Constitution.”). 
213 See id. § 2000cc-5(7)(B) (“The use, building, or conversion of real property for 
the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered to be religious exercise of the 
person or entity that uses or intends to use the property for that purpose.”). 
214 Id. § 2000cc(b)(1). 
215 See Lighthouse , 510 F.3d at 266 (“We see that the Free Exercise jurisprudence of 
the Supreme Court and of this Court teaches that the relevant comparison for purpos-
es of a Free Exercise challenge to a regulation is between its treatment of certain reli-
gious conduct and the analogous secular conduct that has a similar impact on the regula-
tion’s aims.”). 
216 See id. at 293 (Jordan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[I]n-
corporating into RLUIPA the type of ‘similarly situated’ analysis embedded in equal pro-
tection cases would frustrate Congress’s intention of enforcing the Free Exercise Clause, 
because it would make it very difficult for religious assemblies to qualify for relief . . . .”). 
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the bill was to restore the compelling interest test and maintain the 
protection for religious liberty guaranteed by the Constitution.  In its 
attempt to give life to Congress’s intent, the Third Circuit ignored the 
reason why RLUIPA was brought to the floor of Congress in the first 
place:  to take advantage of the space that the Smith opinion left open 
for the protection of religious exercise. 
C.  Strict Liability Versus Strict Scrutiny 
The second prong of the Midrash test is also preferable to that of 
the Third Circuit’s test.  Under Lighthouse, a court imposes a strict-
liability standard on the government upon a finding of unequal 
treatment under the first prong.  The Midrash test, on the other hand, 
requires judges to apply strict scrutiny to the challenged regulation 
upon a finding of unequal treatment.  Although the text of the Equal 
Terms provision provides a strong argument against applying strict 
scrutiny, the text and purpose of RLUIPA taken as a whole support a 
strict scrutiny approach. 
The Third Circuit expressed concern over applying strict scrutiny 
to a challenged regulation because the text of the Equal Terms provi-
sion, unlike that of the Substantial Burden provision, does not ex-
pressly provide for such searching judicial review.  Campbell agrees,217  
as she advocates a strictly textual interpretation of the statute, one that 
disavows both a “similarly situated” requirement and strict scrutiny.218  
She argues that the Midrash approach is flawed because it provides “an 
escape hatch to governments capable of showing that their unequal 
treatment of religious assemblies is the least restrictive means of fur-
thering a compelling government interest.”219  As a result, for Camp-
bell, only a purely textual interpretation of the Equal Terms provision 
would prevent contradiction of the statute’s text, frustration of con-
gressional intent, and weakening of protections for religious liberty.220 
While Campbell’s concerns are valid and worth considering, there 
are several compelling reasons for keeping the Midrash court’s strict 
 
217 Campbell, supra note 14, at 1100. 
218 See id. at 1093 (“[T]his Note argues that courts should interpret the statute ac-
cording to its express terms, which do not include a similarly situated requirement or a 
compelling interest test.”). 
219 Id. at 1103.  Campbell does admit, however, that because the Midrash approach 
addresses the criticism that the Equal Terms provision impermissibly interferes with 
local government, it is “at least marginally better than using the Third Circuit’s similar-
ly situated requirement.”  Id. at 1104. 
220 Id. at 1093-1104. 
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scrutiny prong.  RLUIPA was enacted in the wake of Smith and was 
narrowly drawn to fit into the exception for individualized assessments 
left open by the Court in that case.  Under Smith and Lukumi, the 
compelling interest test governs cases in which the government has in 
place a system of individualized assessments that is either not neutral 
or not generally applicable and that burdens religious exercise.  That 
is why RLUIPA is addressed specifically to religious land use and the 
religious exercise of institutionalized persons:  both activities involve 
individualized governmental assessments that may determine whether 
an individual may freely exercise her religion.  As a result, in the con-
text of land-use regulation, the compelling interest test should control. 
The text and legislative history of RLUIPA support this conclu-
sion.  RLUIPA provides that it “shall be construed in favor of a broad 
protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by 
the terms of this [Act] and the Constitution.”221  The legislative history 
further states that the Discrimination and Exclusion provisions “co-
dif[y] parts of the Supreme Court’s constitutional tests as applied to 
land use regulation.”222  It appears, therefore, that the Equal Terms 
provision would, at a minimum, codify the basic rules of Smith and Lu-
kumi.223  If this is so, the statute thus expressly provides that because 
land-use regulation that differentiates between religious and secular 
assemblies or institutions is either not neutral or not generally appli-
cable,224 the maximum permissible constitutional protection for a vi-
olation of the Equal Terms provision is strict scrutiny of the chal-
lenged regulation.  The Court’s decisions in Smith and Lukumi limited 
the availability of searching judicial review for religious plaintiffs; they 
did not expand constitutional protection for religious liberty to en-
compass strict liability.225  Further, Lukumi mandates that the strict 
scrutiny applied to a regulation be rigorous, and perhaps “fatal in 
fact,” assuaging fears that courts will be less than rigorous in reviewing 
 
221 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g) (2006). 
222 146 CONG. REC. 19,123 (2000) (statement of Rep. Canady). 
223 Cf. Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1232 (11th Cir. 
2004). 
224 See id. at 1235 (“[A] violation of § (b)’s equal treatment provision indicates that 
the offending law also violates the Smith rule . . . .”).  But see Lighthouse Inst. for Evan-
gelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 265 (3d Cir. 2007) (“A regulation 
does not automatically cease being neutral and generally applicable, however, simply 
because it allows certain secular behaviors but not certain religious behaviors.”). 
225 Campbell admits that “a textual interpretation of the equal terms provision might 
prohibit some government regulations that would be constitutional if analyzed under 
free exercise or equal protection jurisprudence.”  Campbell, supra note 14, at 1098. 
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laws that burden religious exercise.226  As a result, and despite the fact 
that Congress may have made the “implicit judgment that no permiss-
ible reason justifies treating religious assemblies and institutions less 
favorably than secular assemblies and institutions,”227 the Midrash 
court’s approach to the Equal Terms provision is the most sound. 
CONCLUSION 
The Third Circuit’s test construes RLUIPA so as to render it prac-
tically ineffective.  It would be difficult, if not impossible, to name a 
secular assembly or institution that could have the same effect on the 
regulatory purpose of a land-use law as a religious assembly or institu-
tion, particularly where other, unrelated laws treat religious groups 
differently.  It is true that if a religious plaintiff could clear this high 
hurdle, the government would not have a chance to demonstrate a 
compelling interest under Lighthouse.  The first prong of the Third Cir-
cuit’s test, however, functions to limit the number of plaintiffs who can 
state a claim of unequal treatment such that courts will not reach the 
second prong in many, if not most, cases.  As a result, future courts con-
sidering this issue should adopt Midrash’s textually sensitive approach. 
When a court interprets a statute and its decision becomes final, 
the court removes that issue from the political process.  If the Ameri-
can people believe that RLUIPA unjustly favors religious entities over 
secular ones, the political process is perfectly capable of facilitating 
the election of representatives who will amend the statute or repeal it 
altogether.  Hopefully, in time, the Supreme Court will step in to re-
store to the American people the democratic rights and religious 
freedom that they were promised by the Constitution and RLUIPA. 
 
 
226 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 
(1993) (“The compelling interest standard that we apply once a law fails to meet the 
Smith requirements is not ‘water[ed] . . . down’ but ‘really means what it says.’” (cita-
tion omitted)); see also Campbell, supra note 14, at 1103 (“[T]here is a risk that courts 
will apply a less-than-rigorous form of strict scrutiny in these religious land-use cases, 
consequently weakening the protections intended by Congress.”). 
227 Campbell, supra note 14, at 1104. 
